The Anduril Red Pill: Luckey is Pitching Defense Lemons

The latest “defense innovation” is just a used car salesman’s pitch for stupidly cutting corners on systems that keep us alive.

Imagine getting rich from gluing your iPad to your face. Anduril Industries wants you to believe they’re revolutionizing defense with some of the dumbest ideas in history.

Slick marketing, venture capital backing, and promises of “21st-century solutions” make them claim to be an Apple of defense. But let’s take a deep look into what’s really happening when shady unaccountable snake-oil tactics find their way into warfare: imagine the used car lot of defense, where lemons are sold to buyers actively being convinced that failure just means they need to come back for more.

Bait and Switch

Traditional defense contractors, for all their flaws, have maintained a simple premise: the government pays for development costs and owns the technology. Companies made huge profits, yet weapons systems weren’t profit centers to be optimized.

Quality came first because that’s what a successful defense strategy actually required.

Anduril flipped this model entirely to eliminate quality. Now they develop products with private investment, retain ownership of the intellectual property, and sell falsely labeled “finished” systems that prioritize profit over government-level quality standards. Is a cover-up innovative?

Wrong.

It’s the oldest trick in the book: shift the incentive structure so that maximizing profit becomes more important than maximizing performance, allowing catastrophe to be institutionalized where troops bear the ultimate sacrifice for some uncaring “whiz” sitting on a beach sipping his Mai-tai. Every dollar spent on redundancy, over-engineering, or extensive testing is a dollar that doesn’t go to a fancy Hawaiian shirt collection. Every corner that can be cut invisibly becomes a margin opportunity to pay for designer flip-flops.

The guy prancing about like a bad 1980s sitcom in flip-flops and Hawaiian shirts making life-or-death decisions about military equipment is in fact damning evidence.

He’s literally living like he’s on permanent vacation while soldiers depend on him to stay alive. Imagine if Magnum PI was cutting corners on helicopter maintenance to pay for daily washing of his Ferrari.

Teenage Fever Dream of Easy Money

There is no disruption other than regression to Silicon Valley’s most toxic impulses. The “move fast and break things” mentality is a false history, which doesn’t even work for building a social media app. When things break, suicide explodes and genocide unfolds while Facebook executives wash all that blood off their hands in luxurious mountainside pools. But when defense systems break, national security evaporates and foundations of democracy crumble.

Anduril’s model treats warfare like a flimsy and simple consumer product market. It’s exactly like Tesla claiming they could solve autonomous driving with cheap cameras instead of expensive sensors.

Wrong.

Need missile defense? Here’s a flash bang of premium features! Don’t like the performance? Wait a year! Still don’t like it? Wait a year! Not yet? Wait a year! Tesla announced in 2016 it had solved driverless such that everyone would stop needing to touch a steering wheel by 2017.

Wrong.

It’s the kind of approach a teenager might dream up with a car salesman father, while playing too many video games, binging on super hero material and watching too many get rich quick pitch decks.

The efficiency argument is particularly idiotic and insidious.

Military effectiveness has never been about efficiency. NEVER. Any basic grasp of history should have prevented Anduril from even getting off the ground. Success in battle is defined by overwhelming capability when you need it most. You want systems to be over-engineered, over-tested, and over-built because “good enough” is what gets people killed. Military-grade literally has meant inefficient to the degree that it can be trusted far beyond consumer performance.

A military-grade demonstration of the Jeep by soldiers of the 92nd Mechanized Reconnaissance Squadron in 1942 at Fort Riley, Kansas. Photo: Farm Security Administration – Office of War Information photograph collection, Library of Congress

But “good enough” is exactly what Anduril is fixated on, to maximize profit and minimize their exposure.

This is Eisenhower’s Nightmare

President Eisenhower clearly warned us about the military-industrial complex not because he opposed defense spending, but because he understood the danger of aligning private elitists with warfare. He knew that once companies are centered on using war to grow their business, they stop being suppliers and become stakeholders in creating death and destruction for profit.

Anduril represents the apotheosis of Eisenhower’s warning. They’re not just profiting from defense contracts, as they’re creating a business model meant to feed on continuous military tension to supply their investments and generate demand for their products. Their success literally depends on the world becoming worse and worse, a plan to lower quality of life by making it more dangerous with the intent to extract huge value from fear. Profits are pinned to massive harm and suffering.

Traditional contractors were cost centers that served national defense as a necessary, albeit controversial, balance. Anduril removes all morality from the equation to hook body counts into growth targets.

Used Cruise Missile Salesman

Like any good con, Anduril’s pitch contains just enough truth to be believable. Yes, traditional defense procurement is slow and expensive. Yes, some legacy contractors have become complacent. But the solution proposed isn’t fixing any problems, it’s flipping the problems to private where they are far less visible and more dangerous.

Instead of transparent cost overruns, you get hidden reliability compromises. Instead of lengthy development cycles, you get rushed testing regimens (e.g. Boeing 737 and 787 catastrophes). Instead of government ownership ensuring long-term support, you get vendor lock-in and subscription pricing for critical updates.

The car salesman tells you the old system was a ripoff while selling you something far, far worse. The difference is that when your used car breaks down, you’re stranded on the highway. When cruise missiles fail, thousands of soldiers don’t come home.

Nixon’s “salesman” approach to American national defense infamously extended the Vietnam War for purposes of getting himself elected President, very intentionally scuttling peace talks. Tens of thousands of American soldiers died as a result. He was thrown out of office, yet how would Anduril be stopped from killing far more?

There’s no Defense Lemon Law

The sinister reality of Anduril’s approach is that the true cost of their corner-cutting won’t be visible until it’s far too late.

Procurement officials will be drawn into faster development times and decreased upfront costs, unable to predict what’s coming. Military planners will be lured into impressive demos and polished presentations, unaware of what they will be looking at later. The reliability issues, the vendor dependency, the profit-driven feature limitations—all of that emerges after the honeymoon, often in the absolute worst possible circumstances with tragedy that can’t be unseen or undone.

By then, Anduril has victims locked in. An entire defense infrastructure will depend on faulty systems. Training will be hooked to bad interfaces. Logistics chains will be optimized for faulty components. So when problems emerge, the “solution” is doubling and tripling down on newer versions that fail again, additional modules that don’t help, premium support packages that can’t deliver.

It’s the predatory subscription model applied to national security, designed to make victims pay forever while delivering the minimum viable product, or even below minimum.

What Real Innovation Would Look Like

True defense innovation would align private incentives with public safety. It would reward reliability over efficiency, proven performance over flashy features, and long-term capability over short-term profits.

Instead, we’re getting the opposite: a business model that treats human lives as acceptable losses in the pursuit of market efficiency. Silicon Valley’s “acceptable failure rate” mindset applied to systems where failure means massive failure and death.

The clear history lesson is that Anduril is financializing defense into failure. They’re not solving complex problems they’re expanding them into a hedge that traps entire countries into becoming victims of wealthy elites. And they’re doing it all while convincing buyers that dependence on profit-maximizing corporations is better than accountability and public safety that come from measures of real quality.

Take the goggles off and look around.

The revolution isn’t coming from venture capital and never has. Silicon Valley was founded on WWII investments by the federal government recognizing that when lives are on the line, efficiency is the enemy of effectiveness. Overwhelming, inefficient, expensive projects define the real Silicon Valley success stories.

Effectiveness, not profit margins, should determine how we defend ourselves.

The used car salesman’s first rule: make the customer think they need what you’re selling. Anduril has convinced the Pentagon it needs to give up control to a guy who doesn’t even understand what control is for.

The Oculus was fundamentally flawed from day one. Motion sickness, clunky hardware, terrible user experience. Facebook bought it for $2 billion and then had to completely rebuild it multiple times. Even now, VR is still a niche market that never delivered on any of the transformative promises.

Meta bet their entire company on the “metaverse” based partly on Luckey’s VR foundation, burned through $13+ billion, and now Zuckerberg barely mentions it. The whole thing was vaporware dressed up as innovation.

So now this same guy who glued an iPad to his face and called it the future wants to build missile defense systems? The pattern is classic con-man: overpromise, underdeliver, but get rich on the hype cycle before anyone notices none of the products actually work.

The truth is simple: when failure isn’t an option, profit shouldn’t be the motive.

Anduril isn’t just theoretically dangerous because of misaligned incentives – it’s concretely dangerous because it’s run by someone whose signature “innovation” was a headset that makes people nauseous.

Launched in 2018, Oculus Go was the biggest product failure [Meta’s former Head of VR Hugo Barra has] ever been associated with for the simple reason that it had extremely low retention…. Most users who bought Oculus Go completely abandoned the headset after a few weeks.

The Pentagon is literally betting national security on a guy whose greatest achievement was selling Facebook a lemon for $2 billion.

Everyone mocked Time magazine for claiming an iPad glued to your face would change the world. And yet somehow an undeserved billionaire was created anyway.

That’s not just concerning, it’s insane. Anduril’s lemons flogged onto defense probably should be illegal.

Efficiency is Idiocy. DOGE is a Racist DOG Whistle

When efficiency becomes the supreme value, it crowds out everything that actually makes systems robust and humane.

It’s weird intellectual laziness disguised as sophistication. Like, “we’ve solved it, just optimize for the single metric!” But real systems – whether they’re societies, ecosystems, or self-driving cars – are irreducibly complex.

The obsession with efficiency creates blindness to interdependencies, to edge cases, to the messy realities that don’t fit the clean model. It’s literally being blind, by refusing to see things that are obvious, acting like a toddler in a tantrum.

It’s why engineered systems fail catastrophically rather than gracefully degrading. It’s why societies that optimize for pure economic efficiency end up weakened, brittle and cruel.

And there’s something almost masturbatory about efficiency worship – this self-congratulatory feeling of having cut through all the “unnecessary” complexity to find the One True Way. But complexity isn’t a bug to be eliminated; it’s often where resilience and adaptation live.

The horrible deadly Tesla failures for example have always been by design, idiocy dressed up as visionary. Musk gets to feel like an emperor for rejecting a “complex” multi-sensor approach, yet meanwhile his cars are literally stopping in intersections and speeding through school zones mowing down children.

The efficiency ideology revealed him as dumb, unable to process basic feedback that the redundancy and “inefficient” backup systems are actually what safety requires.

Historians recognize this. It’s really just an old white supremacist authoritarian impulse that reality must conform to their elegant racist theory of total control, rather than the theory of power adapting to actual human reality.

It’s about a worldview that sees nuance, interdependence, and adaptive complexity as weaknesses rather than strengths.

Whether it’s Nixon’s toxic racist urban planning that bulldozes neighborhoods for “efficient” highways, or economic policies of Reagan that treat human beings as optimization variables, or colonial projects that reduce rich societies to resource extraction opportunities. The feedback loop of oppressive white men is broken by design.

When your system is built around the assumption that you’ve already found the One True Way, then any evidence that contradicts that becomes noise to be filtered out rather than signal to be heeded for true innovations.

Tesla’s dumb deadly Robotaxis stopping in intersections, driving “scary as hell” on the wrong side of the road and committing crimes… aren’t sensor bugs because causing harm to society is classified as an inconvenient fact within a deeply racist ideological edifice.

A single police officer in 1994 killed South African “efficiency experts” (AWB) who had been “gaming” Black neighborhoods by shooting at women and children. It was headline news at the time, because AWB promised a race war to forcibly remove all “waste” from government, and instead ended up wasted on the side of a road.

DOGE is simply a racist DOG whistle.

A South African Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) member in 2010 (left) and a South African-born member of MAGA in the U.S. on 20 January 2025 (right). Source: The Guardian. Photograph: AFP via Getty Images, Reuters

Tesla Cybertruck Burns So Fast Even Six Emergency Response Teams Can’t Save It

What a colossal waste of taxpayer money. DOGE has been cutting funds for public safety while Tesla increasingly wastes public safety funds, like in this report by The Autopian:

Per reports from the San Miguel County Sheriff’s Office, emergency crews attended the fire in the Coventry Hill area just after 1 PM on Sunday afternoon. Along with deputies from the San Miguel and Montrose Sheriff’s offices, Norwood Fire, Naturita Fire, and Paradox Fire crews also reported to the scene where a Cybertruck was on fire…. Thick black smoke could be spotted in the air as 30 firefighters engaged to suppress the flames. US Fish and Wildlife soon joined the fight, supplying additional crews and apparatus to help contain the blaze. The efforts of emergency responders saw the fire 90% contained just two hours after crews arrived on scene. However, that wasn’t fast enough to save the Cybertruck caught in the blaze. The EV pickup was burned to the ground, leaving little more than a bare metal shell sitting in the dust.

30 firefighters and there wasn’t anything saved!?

The “extreme survival” design by the flamboyant Elon Musk is impossible to stop from turning into “little more than a bare metal shell sitting in the dust”. Let that sink in.

Slopcraft: How FBI Killed Own Informants in Mexico

A newly released FBI audit reveals shocking operational security failures that should make Cold War veterans cringe if not cry.

In 2018, during the “El Chapo” investigation, the FBI made mistakes so elementary they belong in a what not to do textbook—and many people were tortured and killed.

The Mexico City Disaster

The June 2025 OIG report describes a catastrophic breach where privately funded hackers systematically identified and tracked FBI personnel:

“In 2018, while the FBI was working on the ‘El Chapo’ drug cartel case, an individual connected to the cartel contacted an FBI case agent. This individual said that the cartel had hired a ‘hacker’ who offered a menu of services related to exploiting mobile phones and other electronic devices. According to the individual, the hacker had observed people going in and out of the United States Embassy in Mexico City and identified ‘people of interest’ for the cartel, including the FBI Assistant Legal Attache (ALAT), and then was able to use the ALAT’s mobile phone number to obtain calls made and received, as well as geolocation data, associated with the ALAT’s phone.”

And it gets worse:

“According to the FBI, the hacker also used Mexico City’s camera system to follow the ALAT through the city and identify people the ALAT met with. According to the case agent, the cartel used that information to intimidate and, in some instances, kill potential sources or cooperating witnesses.”

I am reminded of an investigation in 2000 when my flight to Russia was cancelled last minute. My supervisor blocked the work, related to the fact that coordination with the embassy there may have leaked to Russian technology firm executives who would order a hit. I did everything I could to go, but the leaks were considered too dangerous, and I still wonder to this day if I could have made it out alive. That was 25 years ago.

How Could This Happen Now?

This wasn’t some sophisticated hack, and it wasn’t even an exploit. This was a failure of basic tradecraft that any intelligence professional should have known since the early 1980s:

  • Never assume embassy visitors aren’t being watched
  • Never trust electronic devices in hostile environments
  • Never use predictable patterns or meeting locations
  • Never underestimate local corruption and surveillance capabilities

The FBI’s own assessment admits this threat has been around for dog years:

“Although the risks posed by UTS to the FBI’s criminal and national security operations have been longstanding, recent advances in commercially available technologies have made it easier than ever for less-sophisticated nations and criminal enterprises to identify and exploit vulnerabilities created by UTS.”

The Real Problem: American Hubris

What makes this even more inexcusable is that the FBI knew about these vulnerabilities. The Counterintelligence Division had conducted an extensive analysis called “Anatomy of a Case” that identified these exact risks. But when the FBI formed a “Red Team” to address the problem, they essentially ignored those findings:

“Although CD presented the results of its findings to the Red Team, we were not provided with evidence that the Red Team incorporated or even considered many of the specific vulnerabilities identified in CD’s analysis. In fact, we were told during the audit that the Red Team opted to keep its gap analysis at a high level with an emphasis on generalized UTS policy and training gaps.”

Mexico: a Comms Storm Obvious From Million Miles Away

Operating in Mexico should have triggered maximum paranoia. Consider the environment:

  • Corruption: Wealthy elites have infiltrated government, telecommunications, and security services at every level
  • Technical capability: Elites employ sophisticated hackers and have access to commercial surveillance tools
  • Stakes: Billions of dollars in private wealth at stake make intelligence gathering worth massive investment
  • Ruthlessness: Wealthy elites (e.g. monarchs, cartels, power/transit execs) are known to routinely torture and murder suspected informants

Somehow the FBI thought they would sloppily operate in hostile corrupted foreign environments using the same casual approach they might have thought sufficient in corrupted Texas.

“Existential” Threat

The audit notes that officials from both the FBI and CIA described these technological surveillance threats as “existential.” Yet the FBI’s response was described as:

“disjointed and inconsistent”

The audit found that despite multiple divisions working on the problem, there was no enterprise-wide coordination. Different units were duplicating efforts while leaving massive gaps unaddressed.

Global Pattern of Failure

The Mexico case wasn’t isolated. The audit describes multiple examples of technological surveillance being used against FBI operations:

“The leader of an organized crime family suspected an employee of being an FBI informant. To confirm this suspicion, the leader went through the call logs for the suspected employee’s cell phone looking for phone numbers that may be connected to law enforcement.”

What the FBI refused to admit, despite loss of life, is how dramatically the surveillance landscape has changed. Commercial data brokers, facial recognition systems, cell phone tracking, and financial transaction monitoring have created an environment where:

  1. Every electronic device can be compromised
  2. Every transaction means a trail
  3. Camera systems everywhere: installed, accessed or corrupted
  4. Every communications channel may be monitored

In Mexico specifically, where threats have billions to spend and government corruption is endemic (arguably not unlike America under Trump), assuming any electronic security is foolish.

The audit’s clinical language obscures the human tragedy. When it says the cartel used the information to “intimidate and, in some instances, kill potential sources or cooperating witnesses,” it’s describing torture and murder of people who trusted the FBI to protect them.

These weren’t abstract security failures—they were death sentences handed out through institutionalized safety anti-patterns of incompetence or willful disregard.

Basic Lessons Ignored

The most damning aspect is that this wasn’t a learning experience. The audit, conducted years later, found the FBI still struggling with basic coordination and still making elementary mistakes. As one section notes:

“we do not believe that the initial effort of the Red Team to identify the specific, enterprise-wide risks was adequate, potentially leaving several UTS-related threats unmitigated.”

Basic operational security in Mexico should have included:

  • Assuming all electronic devices are compromised
  • Using air-gapped, disposable communications
  • Meeting sources far from official facilities
  • Employing multiple cutouts and intermediaries
  • Rotating personnel and patterns constantly
  • Treating every interaction as potentially monitored

Instead, the FBI walked sources into obvious embassy surveillance zones while carrying trackable phones as if waving a huge flag that said “target here”.

Broad Implications for American National Securiry

This isn’t just about the FBI. Every law enforcement and intelligence agency faces these same technological threats. The difference is competent agencies adapt tradecraft, which should have been decades ago.

The FBI’s failures in Mexico reveal an institution that was:

  • Overconfident
  • Underestimating
  • Failing to coordinate
  • Ignoring internal assessments
  • Causing fatal risks through negligence and willful disregard

The Mexico City case represents more than operational security failure—it’s institutional hubris with deadly consequences.

When billion-dollar private entities (e.g. Facebook, Palantir, Anduril) can employ sophisticated hackers and have corrupted entire government systems, operating with pre-WWI tradecraft isn’t just stupid, it’s criminal negligence.

The fact that people died because FBI personnel couldn’t grasp basic concepts that any Cold War operative would have understood should be a career-ending scandal for everyone involved in the operational chain.

Instead, it took years of auditing to even acknowledge the problem, and the FBI’s response has been to form committees and write strategic plans while continuing to make the same fundamental mistakes.

In an environment where wealthy elites pay hackers to compromise the entire foundation of public communications, there is no excuse for this level of operational incompetence.

None.