Honda Diesel by 2009

Reported by USATODAY, Honda is aiming to release a diesel vehicle that meets US Department of Energy Tier 2 Bin 5 emissions standards:

As for the diesel, Honda Vice President Ed Cohen said the timing is right to bring a new breed of quieter, smoother, cleaner engines to the USA. They achieve 30% better mileage than comparable gas engines. Volkswagen and DaimlerChrysler also have made a commitment to diesel in the USA.

Their technology is called the 2.2L i-CTDi and is already said to be more efficient, with more torque and less noise and emissions than gas and even the hybrid engines. Watch a nice Honda introductory video here, and read a comparison of honda engines (from Dec 2004!) here.

Who invented public-key cryptography

I went to presentation yesterday where a speaker told the audience the tale of how the three guys from MIT invented public-key cryptography. You know, the RSA trio. I mentioned that they were not the sole inventors (hey, Diffie sits on the crypto panel at RSA for a reason) but was soundly shut-down.

After the presentation I did a little research to double-check and while I thought Diffie-Hellman and Merkle were important, I didn’t realize that another group actually pre-dated even their publication. It turns out that there is a paper from 1987 called The Story of Non-Secret Encryption written by James Ellis. This paper not only describes ground-breaking work done prior to Diffie-Hellman and Merkle, but it gives credit to Bell Labs in 1944 for helping instigate the modern public key cryptography concepts.

Source is available here: http://www.cesg.gov.uk/site/publications/media/ellis.pdf

A paper written by Clifford Cocks (November 20, 1973) called “A Note on Non-Secret Encryption” is also relevant.

Here’s a nice review of the actual history, as told by the Living Internet:

Ellis began thinking about the shared secret key problem in the late 1960’s when he discovered an old Bell Labs paper from October, 1944 titled “Final Report on Project C43”, describing a clever method of secure telephone conversation between two parties without any prearrangement. If John calls Mary, then Mary can add a random amount of noise to the phone line to drown out John’s message in case any eavesdroppers are listening. However, at the same time Mary can also record the telephone call, then later play it back and subtract the noise she had added, thereby leaving John’s original message for only her to hear. While there were practical disadvantages to this method, it suggested the intriguing logical possibility: there might be methods of establishing secure communications without first exchanging a shared secret key.

Ellis thought about this seemingly paradoxical idea for awhile, and while lying in bed one night developed an existence proof that the concept was possible with mathematical encryption, which he recorded in a secret CESG report titled The Possibility of Non-Secret Encryption in January, 1970. This showed logically that there could be an encryption method that could work without prior prearrangement, and the quest in GCHQ then turned to find a practical example.

The first workable mathematical formula for non-secret encryption was discovered by Clifford Cocks, which he recorded in 1973 in a secret CESG report titled A Note on Non-Secret Encryption. This work describes a special case of the RSA algorithm, differing in that the encryption and decryption algorithms are not equivalent, and without mention of the application to digital signatures. A few months later in 1974, Malcolm Williamson discovered a mathematical expression based on the commutativity of exponentiation that he recorded in a secret report titled Non-Secret Encryption Using A Finite Field, and which describes a key exchange method similar to that discovered by Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle. It is not known to what uses, if any, the GCHQ work was applied.

It just goes to show, don’t always believe what you hear in presentations…

Winny and Trend

Winny seems to be peer-to-peer software in Japan that is behind some high-profile incidents. Computerworld reports that even a leading anti-virus company has been bitten by the program:

Trend Micro became the latest of a number of corporations or government agencies to report data losses as a result of viruses on the Winny network. Winny can be downloaded at no charge and is a popular way for Japanese Internet users to exchange music and video files.

Documents, including police investigation materials, training manuals for Japan’s Self-Defense Force, data related to nuclear power plants and information including the names of sex-crime victims, have all found their way into the public domain via Winny, according to local news reports.

The string of leaks led a senior Japanese government official, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, to call on people not to use Winny.

“We cannot prevent information leaks unless everyone takes antivirus measures,” Abe said at a news conference on March 15. “The surest way is not to use Winny.”

Coming next, the Japanese government officials will politely ask people to stop eating Fugu.

Spotty security

Some time ago I remember discussing special ink and paint that UK police said would help in the recovery of stolen items. Just paint your personal items with the invisible stuff and detectives could use special equipment to make it appear later. Thieves presumably would worry whether valuables suddenly become traceable, except for a simple problem. If the detectives can reveal the invisible markings, so can the theives.

Here’s a fine case example of this in practice. DataDot is a company that says you can use a paste with special identity dots to mark your valuables. How does someone later read the hidden dots? Just send $14.95 to Data Dot for a portable blacklight (UV), and another $14.95 for an illuminated 50X microscope. No criminal would ever do that, right?

And another problem is the nature of hidden identification. Whereas a common ID, such as a vehicle identification number, is supposed to be in a particular place and can be reviewed for tampering, etc. a hidden number has no “tamperproof-ness”. A simple chemical might dissolve the datadot without a trace, or even if there were a trace (like heavy scratching) the lack of a standard position for datadot means you might have a hard time proving the dots had been intentionally destroyed. A rub spot could be argued to be just an old rub spot…

But, all things considered, and if the stolen goods are recovered, it seems that the careless or unprepared thief will be more likely than not to be caught by the dot.

On the flip side, one has to wonder if there will be datadot attacks where thieves start painting other people’s stuff and registering it as their own, then claiming it as stolen.