If there’s one thing my time studying Cold War at LSE taught me, it’s that we must learn from history or be doomed to repeat it. The recent CENTCOM press release regarding operations against the Houthi forces is very concerning as a virtual carbon copy of the very mistakes that led us into the quagmire of Vietnam. Frankly, it’s worse because we should know better by now.
When I look at their statistics and claims, I’m transported back to the military briefings I read from the late 1960s. They were called “Five O’Clock Follies” for good reason—saccharin press conferences filled with optimistic assessments that bore little resemblance to ground reality. Today’s claims are just as divorced from strategic reality as they were back then.
The Metrics Mirage: Then and Now
What strikes me most forcefully about the current situation is how we’ve regressed to the same flawed thinking that characterized our approach in Southeast Asia. The parallels are not just concerning—they’re downright alarming.
| Vietnam Era Mistake | Current CENTCOM Approach | Why It’s Worse Today |
|---|---|---|
| Body counts as measure of success | “Killed hundreds of Houthi fighters” | We know from Vietnam that attrition metrics don’t translate to strategic victory |
| Bombing statistics (“X tons dropped”) | “Struck over 800 targets” | We’ve replaced tonnage with target counts, but it’s the same meaningless metric |
| Gulf of Tonkin incident (unverified claims) | Unilateral reporting with no independent verification | After decades of lessons about the need for transparency, we’re back to “trust us” |
| Vague claims about Ho Chi Minh Trail interdiction | “Destroyed multiple command-and-control facilities” | Using the same generic terminology that obscures actual operational impact |
| Blaming outside powers (Soviet Union, China) | “Iran undoubtedly continues to provide support” | Still failing to understand local motivations and resilience |
| Bombing reduction = success narrative | “Missile launches dropped by 69%” | Sophisticated adversaries adapt tactics, and even improve accuracy, rather than give up objectives |
| Endless escalation without clear endgame | “Continue to ratchet up the pressure” | Repeating open-ended commitment despite historical evidence of its failure |
| Minimizing civilian impact | “Minimizing risk to civilians” | Claims without evidence or monitoring, despite better technology for verification |
Missing the Strategic Forest for the Tactical Trees
What disturbs me most is that we’ve had fifty years to internalize the lessons of Vietnam. We spent decades analyzing where we went wrong. Military brass, let alone academics in history departments, sponge up these lessons. Yet here we are, seeing the same fundamental errors in strategic thinking.
The press release’s emphasis on percentages of reduction in missile launches is particularly troubling. The release tosses out a “69% drop in ballistic missile launches” and “55% decrease in drone attacks” as meaningful. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean any reduction in actual damage or successful strikes. During Vietnam, the U.S. often emphasized metrics like “body counts” or “bombing tonnage” that didn’t translate to any strategic gain.
As any basic reader of Vietnam War 101 could tell you, guerrilla forces adapt. When America dramatically interdicted the Ho Chi Minh Trail in one sector, supplies easily moved through another. When North Vietnam’s ports were pummeled with bombs, the logistics dispersed as should have been expected. The Houthis will do the same, and already have given how the Saudis thoroughly bombed them for years.
Attributing Houthi capabilities solely to Iranian backing echoes Vietnam-era assertions that any localized adversaries had to be merely a puppet of China/USSR, grossly underestimating factors and motivations. A fixation on bogus military metrics obscures political reality, like the makeup room for men fiasco glowing up in Hegseth’s face. He literally posted the following statement to deflect attention from him spending so much time and money on his makeup routines:
We should have installed tampon machines in every men’s bathroom at DoD…
In Vietnam, we could win nearly every battle on paper yet lose the whole damn war because we oversimplified us/them and then failed to understand the obvious political dimensions of conflict. Today’s CENTCOM press release shows we’re still thinking in terms of hair gel and eyeliner (appearances of bombs dropped) rather than meaningful political objectives achieved and measured on the ground. I’m reminded particularly of when the USAF claimed it was so successful it had destroyed more trucks than had ever existed in Vietnam.
The notion that destroying a port facility will “impact Houthi ability to conduct operations” misunderstands asymmetric warfare in the same way we misunderstood it in Vietnam, the same way the Italians misunderstood it in Ethiopia. Determined adversaries adapt, improvise, and overcome.
The Way Forward
If we’re serious about not repeating the mistakes of Vietnam, we need to fundamentally rethink our approach. This means:
- Realistic assessments that acknowledge failures, not just known limitations of military power against a politically motivated adversary
- Transparency about clear goals and measured outcomes, with allies and independent verification, rather than open-ended commitments
- Understanding that bombing campaigns alone never, ever defeated determined insurgencies
In Vietnam, we kept doubling down on failed strategies, believing that just a little more force, a little more bombing, would turn the tide. It never did. I fear we’re on the same path again, but this time with Pete “dirty lines” Hegseth kitting out makeup rooms without the excuse of ignorance. This time, we should know better.