The splashy and reckless bombing campaign against the Houthis has stretched into months with an American price tag approaching $1 billion.

It’s one of the most inefficient military campaigns in history, with little to no results of any significance. We’re in fact witnessing a very familiar historical pattern: a superpower exhausting itself against an entrenched insurgency that simply refuses to break. This is something well-known by the 1970s although obviously some still refuse to give up comic-book fictional narratives about death from above.

The Houthis, described ominously by some intelligence as “the honey badgers of resistance,” appear to be not just surviving American strikes, but potentially benefiting immensely from them.

Bombing Has a History of Diminishing Returns

The historical record of even constant flyovers against determined insurgencies underground is dismal:

Vietnam?

Despite dropping more bombs than in all of World War II, including the heavily publicized Operation Rolling Thunder and Operation Linebacker campaigns, America couldn’t break North Vietnam’s will. The Vietnamese moved underground, dispersed their forces, and rebuilt infrastructure as quickly as it was destroyed. Each bombing raid revealed American intelligence without permanently degrading Vietnamese capabilities.

Korea?

Three years of intensive bombing failed to break North Korean resolve. More bombs dropped than all of WWII… The country simply moved critical infrastructure underground and dispersed its forces, emerging stronger and more determined. To this day the country has almost no light pollution at night.

Ethiopia?

When the Soviet Union conducted bombing campaigns against insurgents in Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s, they only hardened resistance and drove recruitment for rebel forces. Eritreans not only grew in power they defeated the Ethiopians, one of the oldest air forces in the world.

Afghanistan?

Two decades of air campaigns yielded little strategic advantage against the Taliban, who simply waited out each bombing campaign before returning to their previous positions.

Iraq?

America’s extensive “shock and awe” bombing campaign of 2003 created impressive visuals but failed to break Iraqi resistance. Instead, it dispersed forces and drove them underground, setting the stage for years of insurgency. Despite complete air superiority, the US couldn’t bomb its way to stability – it required years of counterinsurgency ground operations.

Lebanon?

Israel’s 2006 air campaign against Hezbollah was expected to cripple the organization within days. Instead, after 34 days and over 7,000 air strikes, Hezbollah emerged with its command structure intact and enhanced regional legitimacy. The campaign actually strengthened Hezbollah’s position politically while depleting Israel’s precision munitions.

Libya?

The 2011 NATO bombing campaign initially appeared successful in removing Gaddafi, but it created a power vacuum that insurgent groups quickly filled. Air power alone couldn’t establish political stability, and the country plunged into ongoing factional conflict despite complete NATO air dominance.

And, of coruse, Yemen?

Before the US campaign, Saudi Arabia conducted years of intensive bombing in Yemen beginning in 2015, deploying some of the most sophisticated aircraft and munitions in the world with unlimited budget. Despite a sustained air campaign, the Houthis not only survived but expanded their territorial control and missile capabilities. The Saudi air campaign cost billions while strengthening rather than weakening their adversary.

Which brings us to today.

Why Bombing Fails With Insurgencies

The Houthis must have a copy of the tried and true insurgent playbook that has frustrated big bombers for decades:

1. Dispersal and hardening: Critical assets are scattered and protected, often underground, limiting the damage from any single strike.
2. Intelligence asymmetry: Every bombing run reveals what the US knows, while yielding little new intelligence in return. The Houthis gain valuable information about American surveillance capabilities with each attack.
3. Resource depletion: The US burns through expensive precision munitions while the Houthis conserve their resources for opportune moments.
4. Narrative advantage: Each bombing campaign reinforces the Houthis’ David versus Goliath recruitment propaganda, potentially aiding troops and strengthening resolve.
5. Strategic patience: The Houthis have survived bombardment for years — they’re prepared to absorb punishment and outlast foreign interventions.

America Staring at the Sun

In pursuing this air campaign, America is effectively depleting its stockpiles of precision munitions for little to no benefit. Worse, it’s revealing its intelligence capabilities rapidly, blowing up any advantage it may have once held. Exhausting supplies, stations, airframes and personnel diminishes any readiness for actual need, burning down savings with minimal strategic return as if efficiency doesn’t even matter. All that waste and useless action in fact strengthens the Houthis’ legitimacy in the eyes of their supporters, throwing the whole thing upside down. In fact, increased shipping traffic through the Red Sea – celebrated as a success metric – may actually mask a surge in Houthi rearmament and resupply operations, much like increased truck traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during Vietnam signaled expanded North Vietnamese logistics rather than American success. We risk misreading our own metrics, where apparent “victories” actually indicate strategic failure.

Ground Truth is Truth

History has consistently shown that air power tends to exaggerate itself yet alone rarely achieves decisive strategic objectives against determined insurgencies.

Military analysts readily acknowledge this fact again holds true:

…the only times I’ve ever seen the Houthis go to the negotiating table or compromise has been when they’ve been threatened with the realistic prospect of defeat on the ground.

World War II was ultimately won on the ground in Europe, with air power as support. The Pacific theater required island-hopping ground campaigns alongside naval and air operations. The Japanese didn’t even register the nuclear bombs, because all attention was focused on Soviet advances through Manchuria–surrender came quickly after just days of Stalin’s ground offensive, and had little to nothing to do with American bombs (a truth opposite of how WWII is taught in American schools). Even the much-touted air campaign against Serbia in the 1990s only succeeded when combined with credible ground threats.

Getting Grounded

If American policymakers are serious about neutralizing the Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping, which I doubt anyone is at this point, they face some basic choices. They would have to acknowledge the inherent limitations of air power and develop a comprehensive strategy. Not going to happen. They would have to accept that complete elimination of the threat may not be possible without extremely high costs. Not going to happen. And they would have to contemplate diplomatic initiatives with regional partners who have more direct leverage. Never.

While the U.S. overplays its hand and weakens itself by the day, the Houthis will likely continue to absorb the blows while adapting and waiting out America’s expensive display of ineffective force. As they’ve demonstrated like other groups through decades of conflict, they take a high-altitude punch, get back up, and keep fighting with renewed strength.

With each passing day and over a billion dollars allegedly flushed down an empty hole, America weakens its position while strengthening the narrative of those it seeks to defeat. The honey badgers of Yemen may indeed be laughing at the loose-lips of Hegseth, because they watch the world’s most expensive military only hurt itself as it sloppily throws axes at its own shadows.