A recent article by the AP says “insurgents appeared to be scrambling for power” in Somalia.

The vacuum created by the US-backed Ethiopian intervention is now in full swing and this should be no surprise. As I’ve written before it seems the invasion of Somalia was meant to topple Islamic authorities who were establishing power and were overtly hostile to US objectives in the region. In particular, the US was afraid the shift in power could prevent them from pursuing al-Qaeda and similar militants who sought shelter in Somalia. The reporter calls this “propping up Somalia’s weak government for two years”.

For some reason the US Operation Ajax in Iran against Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953 comes to mind. How long did the US and Britain spend “propping up” Iran’s weak government after the coup and what was the objective?

Many fear the Ethiopian pullout _ and last month’s resignation of Somalia’s president _ will cause Islamic militant groups to fight among themselves for power, bringing even more chaos to this beleaguered Horn of African nation.

“We have to show commitment to do our part in security, we want to help people feel secure,” Abdirahim Issa Adow, a spokesman for one wing of the insurgency, told The Associated Press after deploying troops to three of Mogadishu’s 14 police stations.

His Union of Islamic Courts is not allied to the most powerful insurgent group, al-Shabab, which has taken over most of Somalia.

Insurgents? I wonder if that really is the right term for these groups that are stepping into empty police stations? Bands of milita roamed the American cities in the post-Civil War and pre-police environment but should they now be referred to as insurgents? They represented neighborhoods, and even ethnic groups (e.g. Polish, German, Irish) in an attempt to provide “security” against crime.

Anyway, here’s a key to the ongoing destabilization process:

Step one, state the overt mission to challenge the authority of the ruling forces and use a proxy to intervene:

The Somalia government, with the tacit approval of the United States, called in the Ethiopians in 2006 to support the U.N.-backed government and rout Islamic militants who had taken over most of the country.

Step two, conclude covert security mission (unfettered access to pursue anti-US agents), declare overt security mission (regional stability) to be an ongoing challenge. Feign surprise that a popular movement that won control and had to be routed is now a popular movement that has been able to win increasing control:

…the Islamists were driven from power. But they quickly regrouped and launched an insurgency that continues today

Step three, feign surprise at the blowback and instability now consuming the region:

The anarchy has also allowed Somali pirates to flourish, attacking 111 ships around the Gulf of Aden in 2008, hijacking 42 of them and earning tens of millions in ransom. Fifteen ships with more than 260 crew are still in the hands of pirates, according to the International Maritime Bureau.

Mismatched objectives. To be fair, the US was very successful at achieving its actual objective. The problem is that the cost is spiraling.

The US could actually have set out to stabilize and secure the region and that could have been an entirely different story. It would have involved gaining the authority to legitimately pursue anti-US agents within a sovereign Islamic state that would probably been less than enamored with America. Given Eritrea’s love/hate sentiments towards the US, and the complications of power and control relative to Ethiopia, it is hard to say how things would have turned out had the US taken the more overt path.

Instead, the US bashed down barriers to entry and then went on a witch hunt (again, mostly successful) to capture or kill al-Qaeda operatives in the Horn of Africa. I wish more people could see and understand the real ratio of cost to benefit for this sort of operation in terms of economic devastation to the region, let alone human life lost.

Mosaddeq was deposed but how happy is America with Iran today? Or, for that matter, how happy are the Iranians with Iran today? The two are similar in the sense that Mossadegh sought support from the Soviet Union, much as Somali Islamic militants are supported by al-Qaeda and other groups within Pakistan, Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. There is no apparent drive for assets such as oil in Iran, but access to the Horn of Africa has strategic importance and Eritrea seems to be sliding away from American influence. Alas, without writing another thesis on this region I just wanted to point out that current events appear to follow a familiar pattern of regional destabilization.