RawStory posted an “exclusive interview” yesterday. There are some harsh allegations that altogether appear to be a stern warning to stay away from Diebold systems until an independent and open validation is available:
Previous revelations from the whistleblower have included evidence that Diebold’s upper management and top government officials knew of backdoor software in Diebold’s central tabulator before the 2004 election, but ignored urgent warnings—such as a Homeland Security alert posted on the Internet.
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The 2002 gubernatorial election in Georgia raised serious red flags, the source said.
“Shortly before the election, ten days to two weeks, we were told that the date in the machine was malfunctioning,”? the source recalled. “So we were told ‘Apply this patch in a big rush.’”? Later, the Diebold insider learned that the patches were never certified by the state of Georgia, as required by law.
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Responding to public demand for paper trails, Diebold has devised a means of retrofitting its paperless TSX system with printers and paper rolls. But in Ohio’s November 2005 election, some machines produced blank paper.
The whistleblower is not surprised. “The software is again the culprit here. It’s not completely developed. I saw the exact same thing in Chicago during a demonstration held in Cook County for a committee of people who were looking at various election machines… They rejected it for other reasons.”?
Asked if Ohio officials were made aware of that failure prior to the recent election, the source said, “No way. Anything goes wrong inside Diebold, it’s hush-hush.”?
Most officials are not notified of failed demonstrations like the one in Cook County, the insider said, adding that most system tests, particularly those exhibited for sale are not conducted with a typical model.
California, which recently conducted a test of the system without public scrutiny that found only a three percent failure rate—far lower than earlier tests that found a 30 percent combined failure due to software crashes and printer jams.
Asked if the outcomes of the newest test should be trusted, the whistleblower, who does not know the protocols used in the California test, warned, “There’s a practice in testing where you get a pumped-up machine and pumped-up servers, and that’s what you allow them to test. Diebold does it and so do other manufacturers. It’s extremely common.”?
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The Diebold insider noted that the initial GEMS system used to tabulate votes for the Diebold Opti-scan systems was designed by Jeffrey Dean, who was convicted in the early 1990s of computer-aided embezzlement. Dean was hired by Global Election Systems, which Diebold acquired in 2000. Global also had John Elder, a convicted cocaine trafficker, on its payroll.
Someone convicted of computer-aided embezzlement designed the system? Security clearance is mandatory for many government jobs related to handling sensitive information, one would think that election systems should be treated in a similar fashion. Diebold should be held to a strict burden of proof that their systems are safe, at this point, and not allowed to release any product for public consumption until all uncertainty has been thoroughly clarified.
Alternatively, perhaps Diebold management should ask their staff to use their own systems to vote on future direction for the company and swear that they will abide by the outcome. Live by the sword…