Security Architect’s Guide to ISO/SAE 21434: Vehicle Safety

As any regular reader of this blog surely must know, vehicles have become increasingly connected and reliant on software systems. Rather than harp yet again on the many basic engineering safety failures of Tesla, in this post I will dig into an International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) standard for duty and care in security, which can easily help raise the bar on safety.

The 2021 ISO/SAE 21434 outlines 15 clauses to guide architecture of a cybersecurity program throughout the entire lifecycle of vehicle manufacturing. Let’s delve into the key aspects of each clause, with a special focus on Clause 15 – the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) process.

Clause 1. Scope: ISO/SAE 21434 sets the stage by defining the scope. All phases of a vehicle’s lifecycle are meant to be covered, from concept and design to production, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning.

Clause 2. Normative References: This clause lists the external standards and documents referenced in ISO/SAE 21434, providing a foundation for implementation.

Clause 3. Terms, Definitions, and Abbreviations: Here, the standard provides clear definitions for key terms, ensuring a shared understanding for special or specific terminology used throughout the document.

Clause 4. Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS): ISO/SAE 21434 emphasizes the establishment of a cybersecurity management system within organizations. This system, like the venerable ISO 27001 Information Security Management System (ISMS), drives leadership commitment, accountability, and ongoing improvement.

Clause 5. Organization Security Requirements: This section underlines the importance of developing security within an organization’s risk assessment processes. It also highlights the need for cross-functional collaboration so security gets a seat at the business table.

Clause 6. Product Security Requirements: The standard guides the development of specific cybersecurity requirements for vehicle components, systems, and interfaces. This ensures that security is a fundamental consideration in product development.

Clause 7. Cybersecurity Requirements Engineering Process: This clause details the steps for integrating security requirements into the design and development processes, ensuring engineering management is held accountable to thoroughness and traceability.

Clause 8. Cybersecurity Design Process: The standard focuses on embedding security into the design phase of vehicle components and systems. Secure architecture, threat modeling, and coding practices take center stage here.

Clause 9. Cybersecurity Verification Process: This clause outlines the process for checking implemented security measures meet clause 7 requirements. Testing, reviews, and audits are key components.

Clause 10. Cybersecurity Validation Process: ISO/SAE 21434 stresses the validation of the entire vehicle system’s safety due to application of security. Real-world testing ensures the system aligns with intended security objectives.

Clause 11. Cybersecurity Configuration Management Process: Managing security throughout the vehicle’s lifecycle is crucial. This clause covers the usual suspects in software change management, including version control, dependencies and secure updates.

Clause 12. Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Process for Production: Addressing risks introduced during the production phase is vital. The standard tackles potential manufacturing and assembly defects as they relate to systems security.

Clause 13. Incident Detection and Response Planning Process: This section covers post-operation incident detection and response planning. It includes monitoring, reporting, and preparation for incidents.

Clause 14. Cybersecurity Aspects of Decommissioning Process: The secure decommissioning of vehicles is highlighted, ensuring sensitive data removal and minimizing residual security risks. And on that point, I can’t resist mentioning some recent news from CNBC.

A Tesla Model X totaled in the U.S. late last year suddenly came back online and started sending notifications to the phone of its former owner, CNBC Executive Editor Jay Yarow, months later. The car or its computer was suddenly online in a southern region of war-torn Ukraine, he found by opening up his Tesla app and using a geolocation feature. The new owners in Ukraine were tapping into his still-connected Spotify app to listen to Drake radio playlists, he also discovered.

Don’t ask me why it was news to CNBC Executive Editor Jay Yarow that Tesla regularly fails at basic safety engineering. And that brings us to the best Clause of all…

Clause 15. Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) Process stands out as a critical step in the standard and one that deserves considerable attention. Running the TARA process involves identifying assets, threats, vulnerabilities, assessing impact and likelihood, calculating risk, identifying existing controls, determining residual risk, setting target risk levels, planning countermeasures, implementation, reassessing risk, documentation, verification, communication, and periodic repetition.

It’s a security architect’s dream, if you ask me. Here’s a simple Step-by-Step Process example for running TARA:

Step 1: Identify Assets and Scope

Identify the assets within the vehicle system, including hardware, software, data, and communication networks. Clearly define the scope of the analysis, specifying which parts of the system will be covered.

Step 2: Identify Threats

Enumerate potential threats that could exploit vulnerabilities in the vehicle system. Consider a wide range of threats, including unauthorized access, malware attacks, physical attacks, and social engineering.

Step 3: Identify Vulnerabilities

Identify vulnerabilities in the vehicle system that could be exploited by the identified threats. These vulnerabilities could be related to software, hardware, communication protocols, or human interaction.

Step 4: Assess Impact and Likelihood

Evaluate the potential impact of each identified threat exploiting a vulnerability. Consider consequences like loss of control, privacy breaches, financial losses, etc. Assess the likelihood of each threat-vulnerability pair occurring based on factors such as the threat’s motivation and capabilities.

Step 5: Calculate Initial Risk

Calculate the initial risk for each threat-vulnerability pair using a predefined risk assessment formula. This typically involves multiplying the impact and likelihood scores.

Step 6: Identify Existing Controls

Identify any existing cybersecurity controls or countermeasures that mitigate the identified risks. Evaluate the effectiveness of these controls in reducing the risk level.

Step 7: Determine Residual Risk

Calculate the residual risk after considering the effects of existing controls. This provides an understanding of the remaining risk that needs to be addressed.

Step 8: Determine Target Risk Level

Define the desired target risk level based on organizational risk tolerance and regulatory requirements. This step helps in setting a clear goal for risk reduction.

Step 9: Plan Countermeasures

Develop a plan for implementing additional or enhanced cybersecurity measures to reduce the risk level to the target. Consider a combination of technical, procedural, and organizational measures.

Step 10: Implement Countermeasures

Put the planned countermeasures into action according to the defined plan. This could involve software updates, hardware enhancements, process changes, etc.

Step 11: Reassess Risk

Reassess the risks after implementing the countermeasures. Determine if the risk level has been effectively reduced to meet the target risk level.

Step 12: Document the TARA Process

Document all the steps taken during the TARA process, including the identified threats, vulnerabilities, risk assessments, countermeasures, and results.

Step 13: Review and Verification

Review the entire TARA process and its documentation for accuracy and completeness. Verify that the chosen countermeasures are appropriate and effective.

Step 14: Communicate Results

Communicate the TARA results and findings to relevant stakeholders within the organization. This ensures that everyone is aware of the identified risks and the measures being taken to mitigate them.

Step 15: Repeat Periodically

Perform the TARA process periodically or whenever significant changes occur in the vehicle system. New threats, vulnerabilities, and technologies may emerge, requiring a reevaluation of the cybersecurity landscape.

Finally, here’s a step-by-step example for the TARA process for a vehicle’s connected infotainment system:

Step 1: Identify Assets and Scope

Asset: Connected infotainment system
Scope: Analysis covers software, communication interfaces, and data flows.

Step 2: Identify Threats

Unauthorized remote access, malware injection, data interception, physical access

Step 3: Identify Vulnerabilities

Unpatched software, weak authentication, insecure data transmission

Step 4: Assess Impact and Likelihood

Unauthorized access could lead to data breaches, loss of control. Likelihood varies based on attacker profiles (e.g. FBI MICE) and system exposures.

Step 5: Calculate Initial Risk

Initial risk score calculated for each threat-vulnerability pair.

Step 6: Identify Existing Controls

Firewall blocks generic service port attempts, authentication and encryption are in place, as well as least privilege principle for role-based access.

Step 7: Determine Residual Risk

Residual risk is calculated considering the effectiveness of existing controls.

Step 8: Determine Target Risk Level

Target risk level set to a certain value based on risk tolerance.

Step 9: Plan Countermeasures

Plan includes implementing stronger authentication, regular software updates, integrity checking and monitoring, intrusion detection with alerting.

Step 10: Implement Countermeasures

Countermeasures are integrated into the infotainment system.

Step 11: Reassess Risk

Risks are reassessed post countermeasure implementation.

Step 12: Document the TARA Process

All steps, assessments, and decisions are documented.

Step 13: Review and Verification

TARA process and documentation are reviewed by experts and stakeholders.

Step 14: Communicate Results

Results and actions are communicated to relevant departments.

Step 15: Repeat Periodically

The whole TARA process is scheduled for regular intervals or when system changes occur, much like how any threat modeling process should be built into software engineering cultures.

Keep in mind that each organization’s TARA process may vary based on their specific context, system complexity, and risk appetite. It’s crucial to involve experts with operational and engineering security knowledge and adapt the process to suit the unique requirements of your organization and its vehicle systems.

By embracing the ISO/SAE 21434 standard significant strides can be taken in bolstering the safety of vehicles. Meticulous attention to the clauses will cultivate a more robust security posture that not only safeguards vehicles but also builds trust with consumers and industry stakeholders alike. As technology continues to evolve into more complex interconnected systems, ISO/SAE 21434 provides a roadmap for the automotive industry to navigate the security landscape with a measure of quality from threat modeling.

Now back to explaining why Tesla is unfit to be on any road…

Related: Hundreds of Brand New Teslas Piling Up in Junk Yards

Used Coffee Grounds Mixed Into Concrete Significantly Increases Strength

Grounds for celebration? Just in case you weren’t already using old coffee grounds as compost or pest management for your garden…

…the team experimented with pyrolyzing the materials at 350 and 500 degrees C, then substituting them in for sand in 5, 10, 15 and 20 percentages (by volume) for standard concrete mixtures.

The team found that at 350 degrees is perfect temperature, producing a “29.3 percent enhancement in the compressive strength of the composite concrete blended with coffee biochar,” per the team’s study, published in the September issue of Journal of Cleaner Production. “In addition to reducing emissions and making a stronger concrete, we’re reducing the impact of continuous mining of natural resources like sand,” Dr. Roychand said.

Suddenly cities full of espresso machines have an entirely new construction supply chain model. The scientists claim they were trying to solve for waste and not just hoping to justify drinking 10 cups of coffee per day.

…inspiration for our work was to find an innovative way of using the large amounts of coffee waste…

And so they conclude 100% of the 75,000 tonnes of waste that coffee drinkers produced in Australia can become a source for structural concrete. Worldwide there’s allegedly upwards of 6 million tonnes available. That means plenty of room still for innovations like powering public transit or making milk and mushrooms.

The Mystery Second Plane of Yevgeny Prigozhin That Didn’t Crash

Two identical private jets took off, one returned and landed while the other lay in smoldering ruins. Yevgeny Prigozhin was said to be on board… one of them.

This detail popped into my head as I read the MI6 quote to the Independent.

[Putin is] making clear to everyone inside and outside of Russia that he’s not going to brook any challenge. If there’s a slim chance that he’s not dead and he wasn’t on that plane, he will be soon.

But does he really have to be dead soon? If he has a public death then lives in total obscurity, secretly retired on a Putin pension plan, what’s the real difference?

A slim chance of survival that MI6 mentions certainly could come from being on the other plane, which Russians seem to be talking about.

According to Russian sources, Prigozhin was well-known for trying to deceive any would-be assassins, and often “confused everyone” by running additional flights while he was officially checked in on another charter. The Readovka news agency, which has been linked to the warlord, even said it was “premature” to jump to the conclusion that he had died.

If Prigozhin is not dead, but everyone thinks he is… Putin not only gets what he wants with people assuming there must have been a targeted revenge strike (so very like Mike Pompeo), he also gets to secretly keep his loyal ally in his pocket in case of later need.

One thing that still bugs me about the “attempted coup” narrative that was puffed up around Prigozhin was the lack of any heated meaningful criticism directed at Putin. Blanks were being fired.

His comments were so candid and off-message for a Russian leader that it seemed as if someone had mistakenly handed him a speech… Prigozhin did not criticize Russian President Vladimir Putin by name, focusing instead on the broader Russian elite…

Mistakenly? More like intentionally.

The breathless commentary always read to me like Prigozhin was lamely following a campy coup script that was handed to him by Putin, not even trying to make it look real. Focusing heated rhetorical attacks onto Russian elites makes basically zero sense for any supposed campaign actually planning to dislodge Putin, and Prigozhin is no dummy. Lazy and greedy, yes. Stupid? No.

Plus the “exile” to Belarus plan sounded like an inside joke, given groveling obedience of that state to the Russian dictator. What better place for a fake exile script than a country that says and does whatever Putin orders? Imagine if Snowden tried to exile himself from the US by flying to Texas (the land of all hat no cattle), for a simple comparison.

I’ve studied hundreds, maybe thousands, of coups around the world and the Prigozhin news never sounded to me like he truly opposed Putin. It rang hollow.

Anyway, maybe that second plane has details worth digging into. Two bodies are missing and two have identification issues. “Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House” certainly seems to think it’s too early to judge.

Maybe Prigozhin is right now acting like a beached beluga under a palm tree in Africa, sipping banana juice and laughing about pulling a reverse-Hammarskjold by having his own plane sabotaged.

I’m just saying “Sir John Sawers, 68, who served as Chief of the MI6 between 2009 and 2014” doesn’t throw uncertainty about Prigozhin to the Independent readers without a very good reason.

And in relation to that point, it’s noticeable how Elon Musk consistently appears as a supporter of dictatorship and Putin in particular. The notoriously untrustworthy CEO frequently takes a stance against Ukrainian independence, not out of concern for Putin such as being assassinated, but due to a wealth-driven connection to China. The United States has not taken substantial actions yet to counter the influence of Chinese military intelligence, which has gained significant leverage within Tesla, SpaceX, and now, unsurprisingly, Twitter. This issue becomes apparent among high-ranking officials who oppose Putin; they now find themselves hesitant to engage with Musk’s three highly turbulent and declining for-profit geopolitical corporations. This hesitation stems from the way the Chinese consistently maneuver the coin-operated Musk towards aligning with Putin’s interests.

Scientific Discovery Forces Historians to Rethink 1933 Reichstag Fire

Nobody really, truly believed a “severely impaired” (couldn’t see in right or left eye) and basically ignorant loner such as the Dutch Van der Lubbe could have burned an entire German government building down quickly and single-handedly.

The Communists had thrown him out of the party and denied even a basic role. He was fired from his jobs. He quarreled with police and was jailed. Not the sort of guy who could put any kind of plan together, let alone represent others, yet also a guy who wouldn’t give up trying.

He became attractive to historians for decades in probably the same way he became attractive to the Nazis in 1933 thinking it would be easy to game historians.

People have subscribed to an easy scapegoat theory about Van der Lubbe simply because he carried all the hallmarks of a crime mule; someone who would fall easily into dangerously dumb situations and in no way be able to defend himself against even the most outlandish accusations.

Those subscriptions apparently are changing, finally.

“I used to subscribe to the consensus view that Van der Lubbe was the sole actor behind the arson attack, even if some of the scientific evidence made me a little uneasy,” said Sir Ian Kershaw, whose two-volume Hitler biography established him as one of the leading authorities on the Nazi party.

“In recent years I have become more open-minded about the authorship of the fire, though the alternative scenario has yet to be established,” he said, voicing scepticism that even a toxicological examination of Van der Lubbe’s remains could settle the debate once and for all.

The exhumation’s organiser, Alfred Otto Paul, is more optimistic. While he could not comment on the finding until the completion of the pathology report, he said, he promised that the findings would be momentous. “History as we know it will have to be rewritten.”

Scientific evidence is like kryptonite to Nazis. The article also tries to raise a question:

Carter Hett said the “balance of probability” pointed to the fire having been set by a squad of men from the Nazi’s paramilitary Sturmabteilung (SA) wing…. How exactly these men would have managed to recruit a committed communist for their cause, however, remains unclear. “It is true that we are lacking any evidence as to how a link-up between Van der Lubbe and the SA could have come about,” Carter Hett said. “It does still seem insane that they would have picked this unstable, almost blind young man as the fall guy.”

Insane? Not at all. The SA lied to him and about him, as if he were just an unwitting gullible pawn. Journalists cautiously wrote in 1934 of exactly such probabilities.

…[it’s just a theory that] Nazis employed penniless van der Lubbe to help them set the fire, promising to save his neck by a Presidential reprieve and to reward him handsomely for hiding their identity and taking the whole blame in court [increasingly detached from reality].

A mostly blind, desperate and easily fooled guy had been failing miserably several times at lighting government buildings in Berlin on fire. He surely was noticed and opportunistically used by Nazis if not completely owned by them, in the same way any sloppy brazen arsonist raises attention in a police state.

A more real question is how he moved from being the guy so blind and incompetent he couldn’t successfully light anything on fire to… completely alone generating such a huge blaze of unparalleled widespread acceleration (exactly the kind of arson plans the Nazis became infamous for later) that he wasn’t in any way part of someone else’s work?

Of particular note is how Van der Lubbe abruptly was transformed from a random and loudmouthed incompetent loner seeking social entry — saying he would never accept suicide and wouldn’t stop jumping at dumb ideas with low chance of success — into the exact opposite person.

Van der Lubbe was said to have gone [in the hands of German police] from being healthy and energetic to being apathetic and unable to wipe his own nose. Journalists at the time of his trial suggested he could have been given scopolamine, which has been dubbed a ‘truth serum’ for its alleged ability to get those who are given it to reveal information.

Previously after police handled him in jail he had come out even more energized and ready to fight. This time? Something very, very different happened in the process of being interrogated and incarcerated for the very thing he went into so vigorously.

If he was so proud of resisting before, so full of independent energy and ready to act alone on personal crazy plots, why would an unbelievable success of his attack then collapse him into a lifeless, empty soul unable to function at all, sleeping or laughing away his trial begging for certainty in a quick death?

Most likely his sad hung head, his lethargy and inability to recognize reality, was from an intentional effort to abuse him into presenting the face of a “defeated working class“.

And also notable was Hitler’s pronouncements at this time:

‘At least we have not set up a guillotine,’ Hitler said in a news-paper interview at the end of 1933. ‘Even the worst elements have only needed to have been separated from the nation.’

Van der Lubbe then was sent on Hitler’s orders straight to a guillotine in January 1934.

During the night a guillotine was hastily knocked together in the prison courtyard. […] Commented a high Nazi official in Berlin, “It was a concession that he was not hanged. The [retroactive] law specifies hanging for political arson but hanging is a shameful death. Van der Lubbe was spared that.”

How lucky to not use the guillotine. How lucky to use the guillotine. Whatever is convenient for Nazis.

Surprised? The thing Hitler said in 1933 was “at least” not set up was quickly set up, to be known as the 1934 preferred and standard Nazi execution method. Then guillotines were ordered by Hitler to scale into every Nazi prison, killing over 16,000 people in the following years.

In many ways you have to read whatever the Nazis said as intentional inversions of what they knew and believed — calculated destruction that erased trust in anything said or written, in order force everyone to go to Hitler and only Hitler for the latest version of his twists and turns. As the infamous Nazi saying went…

If you cannot recognise the will of the Fuhrer as a source of law, then you cannot remain a judge

Historians seemingly are standing by for what comes next, as they begin to withdraw from low cost subscriptions to the forever flimsy Van der Lubbe story.