It is hard not to think the Florida education system is failing on many levels. Never mind the crazy man who says he runs a church based on hate, the “story” of the day is now about a stuffed animal that quickly became an anti-terror bomb-squad playground exercise.

Authorities blew up a stuffed pony — determined to be a “suspicious device” — after it was found outside a central Florida school. The Orange County Sheriff’s Office reported that the toy was found near the Waterbridge Elementary School Tuesday morning.

No one was allowed in or out of the building while bomb disposal experts destroyed the stuffed animal. It was ultimately deemed “non-threatening.”

No injuries were reported.

Was it possible to determine it to be non-suspicious or were the options limited? I mean was there an inherent bias in the risk model? Did anyone ask teachers and the children next door, for example, if a toy was recognized? Missing? Maybe the security orders went something like this:

• “Warning. This is the police. No one is allowed in or out of the building.”
• School Teacher: “Um, ok, but can you tell us why we are in lock down?”
• “There is a stuffed toy in the playground. We find that to be suspicious.”
• “Sally! How many times have I told you not to forget your toys?”
• “I’m sorry Ma’am that’s a good try but we can not take any more chances here. We are going to deploy a robot, which we have not had a chance to use yet. It will deploy highly toxic and destructive charges. This should only take a couple hours and totally be worth it. Have you ever blown up a stuffed toy? It’s amazing how stuff evaporates, ha ha, like…ahem, this is not for you to see. Please stay in a locked room with the children until our fun, I mean risk, has passed.”

Someone reported hanging wires and that was it for the pony?

I still remember that an innocent man, Jean Charles de Menezes, was shot in the head by UK police after hanging wires were reported from his coat in the London Tube.

That horrible tragedy of poor judgment and excessive use of force led to “new guidelines for dealing with the ‘spontaneous sighting of a suspected suicide bomber'”.

These new police and anti-terror guidelines have actually saved another man’s life, again falsely suspected to be a threat.

A security official said: “He had a very lucky escape. It’s also amazing that the member of the public who spotted him didn’t shout something out and cause a panic on the Tube.”

Interesting that the police commend the public for not over reacting. The pony was not so lucky.

Meanwhile back in Orlando real crimes go unsolved while a stuffed animal in a school playground becomes a test of certainty…

Yup, definitely just a toy pony.

The BBC calls them cowboy clampers.

Apparently it is legal for anyone (claiming property rights) to place tickets on a vehicle and demand payment for use of space. More interesting is that people in the UK actually pay tickets issued by random private entities that are not “registered” with any authority.

To prove how easy it is to do that, we purchased two “DIY parking enforcement kits” on the internet.

One cost £60, the other £30.

For that outlay, you get a couple of signs to warn motorists that the land is private, and that parking is not allowed.

One set of signs indicated that the fine would be £90.

The kits also come with a book of tickets, and waterproof envelopes.

To complete the effect one of them also contains a yellow high-visibility jacket.

If the parking enforcement firm is registered with the British Parking Association (BPA), it can track down any offenders through the DVLA computer.

If it is not registered it can just chance its arm by placing a ticket on your windscreen.

30% of offenders just pay up, with no questions asked, to avoid the hassle of challenging the ticket.

It says a lot when 30% would rather comply than deal with the “hassle” of refusing to pay. That data might be skewed, however. There was a problem of wheel clamping. That is now illegal, so only tickets will continue. Far less hassle to refuse a ticket than remove a clamp. Still, my guess is this entire scheme would go nowhere in most other cultures or even lead to revenge and counter-measures like property vandalism.

Interesting thoughts on the cloud from a blog on e-discovery by the authors of specialized software for e-discovery.

The key phrase “possession, custody or control” is something to be examined more closely in the context of Cloud Computing environments, where typically the cloud customer is the party in control and the cloud service provider is the party in possession and custody. In cases where the cloud customer is the party in litigation, it is natural to serve pre-trial a discovery request under Rule 26 (b) to the cloud customer and expect that since they are the party in control, and can therefore instruct the cloud provider to perform at least some form of collections. Now the question that remains is whether the same request can be made of the cloud provider, since they are the party in possession and/or custody. It is evident that requesting the cloud provider to perform a discovery request on behalf of their customers is impractical since any assertion of privilege or confidentiality would require the cloud customer to be involved in the discovery request. Besides, the cloud provider producing documents without consent from the customer of the cloud would run afoul of the Stored Communications Act (SCA). For these reasons, the broader three-pronged test of “possession, custody or control” embodied in Rule 34 (a)(1) should be revised to mean only “party in control”.

That says to me that discovery should no longer hinge on where data resides; the only test would be access to the data. This argument is said to be based on a notion of cloud provider possession and custody but delegation of control to a customer.

Their blog explains that removing a possession and custody test removes the chance a client will try to waive an obligation for e-discovery in the cloud. It also removes the obligation of a cloud provider to respond to e-discovery if they have only possession or custody.

Two things come to mind from this. First, it supposes that e-discovery is easier with a client than a provider — a provider may have no knowledge of what data constitutes a business record subject to discovery. A provider that turns over a cloud environment can easily over-deliver and provide more data than required. Second, it supposes that a client can know the inner workings of a provider well enough to understand archives and residue of their data.

These two points are counter to each other. Only the provider knows where data goes, but only the customer knows what data is relevant. Without the first half there is a real possibility that data will exist and never be found by a client during e-discovery. This is not far from pre-cloud environments where an IT department would not be involved in discovery. A legal department might install a tool to answer discovery requests, which technically would not address the residue policies and procedures known by IT.

Take email, for example. A company policy could say that local mailboxes are prohibited. A central mail server would have a master repository of messages, as is usually the policy set forth by legal. However users might still have a regular habit of archiving local copies, as is usually the behavior in response to policies set forth by legal. The non-IT manager of a centralized mailbox — client in control — would likely respond to discovery with an incomplete set of data while the IT managers — provider in possession or custody — would be more likely to provide a more complete picture of the mail ecosystem and include localized backups and copies of deleted messages.

A lack of obligation on the provider will mean a lack of pressure for the technical tools and techniques to serve a technology shift in discovery. A customer is unlikely to push for this capability, or even realize the capability exists. Thus possession and custody tests still seem relevant to me.

Ok, three things come to mind. A company that sells e-discovery software might not want possession and control to be part of the definition in a cloud environment because it may challenge their current software capabilities. The cloud provider could introduce technical issues (e.g. VM volume residue) that current e-discovery software may be unable to accomodate.