Hegseth’s statement about being “clean on OPSEC” while simultaneously sharing sensitive military plans in an unsecured commercial app with an unvetted group that included a journalist shows a profound disconnect from reality.

1215ET: F-18s LAUNCH (1st strike package)
1345: ‘Trigger Based’ F-18 1st Strike Window Starts (Target Terrorist is @ his Known Location so SHOULD BE ON TIME – also, Strike Drones Launch (MQ-9s)
1410: More F-18s LAUNCH (2nd strike package)
1415: Strike Drones on Target (THIS IS WHEN THE FIRST BOMBS WILL DEFINITELY DROP, pending earlier ‘Trigger Based’ targets)
1536 F-18 2nd Strike Starts – also, first sea-based Tomahawks launched.
MORE TO FOLLOW (per timeline)
We are currently clean on OPSEC
Godspeed to our Warriors.

What’s particularly troubling is the contradiction between:

1. Claiming to value operational security
2. While completely failing to implement even basic security measures

The fact that detailed military strike plans were shared so casually, and that no one noticed an unauthorized participant for days, suggests either a complete lack of understanding about security protocols or a dangerous indifference to them, or both.

This kind of detachment from factual reality can be extremely dangerous in military contexts where lives depend on proper security procedures. History offers clear reminders of the consequences of OPSEC failures.

In 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion collapsed partly because operational security was compromised—Cuban intelligence had detected preparations for the invasion, allowing Castro to mobilize and position his forces before the exiles even landed. The operation that was supposed to appear covert had become an open secret, with details appearing in newspapers like The New York Times days before the invasion.

The impatient and sloppy approach demonstrated by Hegseth is especially concerning coming from senior defense leadership who should understand these historical lessons about the importance of protecting sensitive operational information.

It raises serious questions about competence and whether there’s a culture of saying the right words about security while ignoring the actual implementation of security measures.