Charles Bukowski once wrote “The difference between a democracy and a dictatorship is that in a democracy you vote first and take orders later; in a dictatorship you don’t have to waste your time voting.” Cynical, no? This came to mind when I watched Donald Rumsfeld on the air with Jon Stewart. They discussed why Americans trusted their elected officials in the decision to go to war with Iraq. More specifically, they debated how and why the US President decided the timing of when to go. I found it not only confirms what I wrote in 2007 about Curveball, but adds a whole new dimension to the debate. Here is my quote from Vagabond Scholar in 2007.

Psychologists have long known that typically, human beings tend to look for evidence to support their views, not for evidence to contradict them. This dynamic makes the thorough vetting of critical intelligence all the more crucial.

And here is what I wrote in 2006 about Risk Homeostasis:

The synopsis of Wilde’s theory is that if you perceive a change will make you safer, then you actually may be prone to take more risk, thus negating the actual risk reduction. However, if you want to be safer than you will make real tangible reductions in risk.

Today I can point you to Rumsfeld himself who talks about his October 15, 2002 “Parade of Horribles memo” (see part 2 below). He openly admits that while the President and his men were full of uncertainty in private, they felt Bush was required to put on the appearance of certainty for the public…so certainty was provided to the public for the purpose of appearing to have certainty. Rumsfeld says this is the need for a leader to show confidence. I agree with the last step in his argument, a leader should show confidence. However, I strongly disagree that a leader should show confidence only for the purpose of showing confidence. The missing link to private confidence seems to be lost on Rumsfeld.

In all fairness, Rumsfeld is stuck in a tough logical corner. If he argues there was confidence in private, then he makes the Administration look like fools for being wrong and believing bad intelligence information. The German intelligence experts and many in the CIA, for example, were not so easily fooled. That clearly would be a tougher position to defend. Thus, he takes the other argument. They had no confidence in private. Now he has the tough job of explaining why they were so confident in public. Saying it was a requirement of the role is weak. He needs a better explanation. A democratic leader should never trade in false confidence, which is basically where his story ends up. This leads Stewart to continually ask why the Administration worked so hard to get Americans to believe that Iraq was in possession of WMD.

Rumsfeld’s response to Stewart centers around the point that he and the Administration did not “rush” in their decision. That fits well with his argument about their private lack of confidence. Unfortunately, while he may say there was no rush, it just begs the question why they acted when they did. Who set the time line to decide, if not President Bush? A no-rush decision means to me they could have taken far more time evaluating the risks before advocating a decision to invade.

Updated to add: A new investigative story says a US Army General gave orders to troops to direct propaganda methods (designed to influence enemy combatants) against congressional delegations to get their support for the war…

The U.S. Army illegally ordered a team of soldiers specializing in “psychological operations” to manipulate visiting American senators into providing more troops and funding for the war, Rolling Stone has learned – and when an officer tried to stop the operation, he was railroaded by military investigators.

I guess the General thought he found an easy way to skip Congress right past the voting and into taking orders.