Category Archives: Security

Android Phone Ads Banned

Motorola has pushed their marketing too far according to the UK Advertising Standards Authority.

The company claimed in a series of ads that the phone was incapable of any injury owing to its strong design. One of the ads showed someone dropping the device on the dance floor and another showed the device submerged in the pool.

The ads contained words like “dance floor proof”, “splash proof” and “life proof”. The ASA however, believes otherwise.

The regulator said that it was reacting to complaints made by three device owners who claimed that the screen of their Android based Defy handset cracked after they dropped it.

The ASA ruled that the ads were ‘misleading’ and should be banned.

Only three failures? Out of how many units in the field? I mean at least they did not claim the phone hacker proof, malware proof…

Cloud Security: 云安全之合规性:访Flyingpenguin总裁

News from Beijing in Chinabyte.com

比特网Chinabyte11月3日原创 11月2日,2011RSA安全大会信息安全国际论坛在京举行,Flyingpenguin总裁Davi Ottenheimer在会上发表了题为《在云环境中筹划安全》的演讲。泄密、数据完整性丢失、停机对于虚拟环境来说并不陌生,Davi Ottenheimer介绍了组合和衡量各种安全成分的一些新方法,即使是在大型多租户、多层次的安全状况下依旧能满足要求和实现合规性。演讲结束后,就云安全的合规性、从安全角度进行云供应商选择等问题Davi Ottenheime接受了比特网记者的采访。

Or, in other words:

Davi Ottenheimer describes the various security components, mixes and measures of new methods, even in large multi-tenant, multi-layered security situations that still are able to meet regulatory requirements and achieve compliance.

VXLAN Primer

There is a nice summary and introduction to VXLAN on BORGcube. Note the system responsible for encapsulation as that is always a focus area of manipulation. Can a guest probe ARP information on another host, for example, beyond what the local host is meant to reveal?

…you can think of VXLAN as a tunneling scheme with the ESX hosts making up the VXLAN Tunnel End Points (VTEP). The VTEPs are responsible for encapsulating the virtual machine traffic in a VXLAN header as well as stripping it off and presenting the destination virtual machine with the original L2 packet.

VXLAN Example

US Security Experts Bemoan “Colander” Model

Note that some of the most effective armor technology on land and sea uses a porous model.

First, take for example a visionary in World War I realized it’s better to be flexible in order to make breaches quickly disappear (render them ineffective) rather than to try only to prevent them (allow cracks to form in a solid and be exploited). That idea led to self-sealing fuel tanks for aircraft and vehicles.

The US military is still funding research to find ways to use a flexible yet porous membrane to prevent leakage for water tanks as well as fuel. Here is a typical modern breach response study application:

…enable vehicle operation in hostile environments and minimize loss of fuel due to a direct/indirect hit…

Second, another interesting example is a membrane developed on submarines in World War II that can subdue enumeration (e.g. sonar) by an attacker. An anechoic tile is porous enough to allow signals in yet prevent them from a “bounce” back out. Porous sound canceling material also can be found in recording studios.

Anechoic Tile

Third, polytetrafluoroethylene (often known for its use in Gore-Tex) is another great example since it is used to make fabric waterproof yet breathable — porous yet impermeable.

Gore-Tex Schema

I said earlier to take note of the porous model because Wired has offered the following chilling quote in a story called Darpa Begs Hackers: Secure Our Networks, End ‘Season of Darkness’ about the state of American cyber security.

U.S. networks are “as porous as a colander,” Richard Clarke, the former White House counterterrorism chief turned cybersecurity Cassandra, told a packed ballroom.

He says that like being porous is a bad thing. I would rather hear response time is inadequate or that the US needs to develop better tools for the job to distinguish friend from foe (e.g. grapes from water)

Colander in action

Begging hackers to develop a perimeter with no holes, or to imply that a security barrier should never be porous, will trend things worse not better. It would be more effective to spend resources (beg hackers) to help on threat recognition, redirection and response.

A solid perimeter will never be truly solid as history shows time and time againand again.

US Commodore Perry's Ships Breach the Japanese Perimeter in 1853

To retain and protect assets while dispensing/releasing threats, which is exactly what a colander is designed to do (and why a chef uses one), is not an inherently bad model. As the military examples show above there is a long history of developing highly technical colanders that provide an efficient security solution to handle even the highest risk environments.