Category Archives: Security

Tesla Cybertruck Stops in Highway Lane, Then Runs Stoplights and Signs

The CHP found an unresponsive man in a Tesla stopped in a highway lane. When be was finally awakened by the sound of his window being smashed, then he couldn’t be stopped.

The CHP first came across the Cybertruck about 12:45 a.m., when the vehicle was stopped in the number 3 lane on southbound U.S. Highway 101 near the exit to Marin City/Sausalito.

Officers found a man behind the wheel unresponsive and attempted to contact him, but when they tried to break the vehicle’s window he became alert and drove away.

A chase ensued and reached speeds up to 100 mph as the fleeing driver allegedly ran stop signs and red lights, crossing the Richmond-San Rafael Bridge into the East Bay, the CHP said.

It’s Called Fraud: Silicon Valley Billionaires Wearing Karl Marx Masks

The men who promise future “universal high income” from AI abundance won’t tolerate a one-time 5% levy to fund healthcare now.

The gap between rhetoric and revealed preference is the whole game. They’ll promise trickle down paradise tomorrow as long as they can hoard today, and tomorrow never comes.

It’s called fraud.

The “socialist” vocabulary they float serves a specific propaganda function: it preemptively neutralizes redistribution demands by positioning billionaires as already on board with sharing. No need to organize, regulate, or expropriate because you should just trust them to pay their share.

Then they don’t, and what are you or anyone else going to do about it?

As noted in an astute article by Noreena Hertz, the promises arrive after the accumulation phase, from people whose entire careers have been defined by aggressive tax avoidance, regulatory capture, and labor suppression. Their pledge of “universal high income” has exactly the credibility of a Victorian mill owner promising the welfare state, which is to say, absolutely none.

It’s called fraud.

They’re proposing that governments “socialize only the returns” – which means the public bears the risks (job displacement, social disruption, infrastructure costs) while private actors capture the productive capacity itself. That’s not a departure from trickle-down; it’s its perfected form.

Look at what they’re not proposing:

  • Not worker ownership of AI systems
  • Not public ownership of foundational models
  • Not democratic control over deployment decisions
  • Not binding redistribution mechanisms with enforcement

This is trickle-down economics rebranded into “socialist” vocabulary with no actual positive outcome. The structural logic is identical: concentrate ownership now, promise benefits will flow to others later, with no binding mechanism to enforce it. The only difference is rhetorical packaging – instead of “let us keep our wealth and jobs will materialize through market magic,” it’s “let us keep ownership of everything and checks will materialize through our future generosity.”

It’s called fraud.

Larry Page is protesting a one-time 5% tax on his hundreds of billions of accumulated wealth to protect his island-purchasing power. He’s relocating his wife’s marine conservation charity out of state to ensure not one dollar of his wealth contributes to California healthcare, even indirectly, even from the philanthropic arm that’s supposed to demonstrate he has a social conscience.

Meanwhile, Jensen Huang said he’s “perfectly fine” with staying and paying the tax, because why wouldn’t he? The flight is a choice, not an economic necessity, and it isolates the ones leaving as making an active ideological statement about who deserves what.

And remember who started this conversation: Elon Musk, promising “universal high income” along with flights to Mars by 2018, and driverless cars by 2017, while having already relocated Tesla’s headquarters to Texas in 2021 – after taking billions in California taxpayer subsidies.

It’s called fraud.

The man promising future abundance has already demonstrated he doesn’t deliver on predictions and won’t pay present obligations.

As Hertz puts it:

In their envisioned future, the “springs of cooperative wealth” will flow so abundantly that people will receive “according to their needs,” not according to the hours they clock in a factory. If that last sentence sounds familiar, that’s because it comes from Karl Marx.

Elon Musk attacked Black Americans by calling them “Hungry Santa” demanding handouts – using mock Black dialect in July 2020 to harm Black Lives Matter protesters. Now he wants us to believe he’s the Hungry Santa – promising if you give him everything he will give you what you need. Same costume, different marks. Source: Twitter

Billionaires quoting Marx while acting like Rockefeller.

If you think charity spend by billionaires today is controversial, just look back at the early 1900s during industrialization.

It’s called fraud.

“How Google Does It” for AI Security Agents… Doesn’t Tell You “How Google Does It”

Google published a guide to building AI agents for cybersecurity. It contains no architecture, no metrics, no failure analysis, and no adversarial threat modeling. Instead it contains the assertion that Google is doing AI security. It offers four recommendations indistinguishable from any enterprise software deployment checklist since, oh I don’t know, 2005.

This matters, because Google is claiming an authoritative voice, stepping up and then… whoops.

The danger isn’t that Google is wrong, per se. It’s more like they are having a wardrobe malfunction, that their advice is insufficient while dressed as comprehensive.

When Google says “here’s how we do it,” we’re all here waiting for Google’s actual methodology to keep us safe and warm. Then we’re left cold and exposed.

Examples?

  1. The piece recommends “quality agents” to verify other AI agents. If your verifier shares architectural assumptions with the system it’s checking, you’ve added complexity without adding assurance. You’ve built a system that fails confidently. I’ve written and spoken about this many times, including a recent IEEE article on integrity breaches. When multiple systems make the same error, it’s not redundancy because it’s correlated failure. That can be worse than no safety net, because you operate as if you have one. Flawed agents to cover for flawed agents is how Ariane 5 blew up.

    A 64-bit velocity calculation was converted to a 16-bit output, causing an error called overflow. The corrupted data triggered catastrophic course corrections that forced the US $370 million rocket to self-destruct.

  2. Their success metrics center on analyst trust and feature requests. Trust measures psychology, which is much broader and more interesting than narrow technical visions of control. A team can be enthusiastic about a tool that’s completely missing threats. The relevant question—what did the agent miss that humans would have caught—goes unasked.
  3. Most remarkably for a security-focused guide: no discussion of attacks on the agents themselves. Prompt injection. Adversarial inputs. Training data poisoning. Any autonomous system with security permissions is a high-value target. Treating AI agents as trusted infrastructure rather than attack surface is the foundational mistake I’ve spent years warning about at RSA. If you aren’t automatically asking whether your security agent is a double-agent, you aren’t ready to deploy agents.

The “how we do it” framing implies authority as well as a form of completeness. It suggests that you should be following Google to take the steps to go where they must be already. But that doesn’t make sense when you read the text. It gets you to where you either already know that’s not how things are done, or you aren’t getting it done.

Confidence, unearned, is the actual “intelligence” vulnerability. Google just demonstrated it.

From 2026 Berlin Power Outage to 2014 Sony Hack: Follow Russian Cables

While writing this week about the Russian “Vulkangruppe” attacking Berlin, I was reminded of the Sony hack attribution games we played a decade ago.

The isolationist narrative of DPRK was always wrong. It served people who wanted easy answers in both directions. The harder truth has been that North Korea leaked evidence of its Russian-enabled connectivity for nearly twenty years, as anyone willing to trace the rails and cables would know.

Source: CSIS 2019

I don’t take victory laps on attribution. But I’ll take one on the flyingpenguin blog methodology, because it might help set context for what’s happening in Germany today.

In January 2015, I published an investigation here that traced North Korea’s internet infrastructure to Russia.

Remember?

The security community was so busy arguing about whether DPRK was sophisticated enough to have hacked Sony, I doubt anyone noticed the more mundane proofs right in front of them. When the usual skeptics insisted the hermit kingdom lacked connectivity, while the FBI asked us to trust classified evidence, both seemed unnecessarily closed minded.

I took a different, rather classic, approach: follow the open rails, look for the exposed cables.

This is how I identified Russian TransTeleCom as the likely provider, which led to identification of even far greater Russian involvement. I traced their fiber network to the border, by following the railway. I found the Khasan-Tumangang crossing and located photographs showing cables running across the bridge into North Korea. And I noted this was a decade after the 2006 agreement between TTK and the DPRK Ministry of Communications.

In September 2017, 38 North and FireEye finally confirmed that TransTeleCom had gone live as North Korea’s second internet provider, using exactly the infrastructure I’d documented on this blog two and a half years earlier.

The connection runs through the Friendship Bridge at Khasan-Tumangang, precisely where I’d spotted the cables on a pole.

Fast forward to today and Trend Micro published research in 2025 on North Korean cyber operations, officially identifying Russian IP ranges in Khasan and Khabarovsk as key infrastructure for DPRK offensive activity. They note the railway station at Khasan facilitates operations across that exact same bridge I was showing photographs from Panoramio a decade ago.

…North Korea’s significant role in cybercrime – including campaigns attributed to Void Dokkaebi – is facilitated by extensive use of anonymization networks and the use of Russian IP ranges. …Ukraine, US, and Germany have been targeted in these campaigns…

The methodology holds. PR maps, rail schedules, flight routes, treaty boundaries, and even eye-level photography. None of it means classified access or insider sources. It is only following physical infrastructure through physical territory to find the copper or glass running through places controlled by states with interests.

The same methodology applies today when we are tracing who’s really attacking critical infrastructure. Find and follow the burned cables in Berlin or San Francisco, and watch how you end up looking at a heat source from Russia. Protip: look wherever AfD shows interest.