Category Archives: Security

The ticking time bomb fallacy

W

Bruce posted a brief excerpt from the Balkan blog. I especially appreciated the comments by Sparohok. They brought to mind President Bush’s message last month at a news conference:

[Our interrogators] don’t want to be tried as war criminals. … They expect our government to give them clarity about what is right and what is wrong.

While this makes sense, Sparohok clearly refutes the Bush approach to finding clarity — arguably Vice President Cheney’s position. A relaxation of laws against torture will make them far more complex to decipher. Sadly, that could be the reason that Bush is putting up a fight with the Geneva convention. Generating more confusion in the matter of what is to be considered torture while calling it a campaign for “clarity” sounds like a very slick ruse dreamed up by Cheney himself to side-step any risk of accountability.

Too bad Bush flip-flopped from his December 2005 statement that he supported the McCain bill against torture:

The new legislation, Bush said, will now ”make it clear to the world that this government does not torture and that we adhere to the international convention of torture, whether it be here at home or abroad.”

But it turns out he was just giving lip service, perhaps because he knew he could not win the debate fairly. Instead he quietly appended one of his infamous signing statements to the bill after signing that said he would only enforce the ban “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the president” that would still allow “protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.”

Clarity indeed…what appears to be happening is Bush is playing a desperate political game, surely with Cheney in the drivers seat, to hide folly and shirk accountability:

There has been growing uneasiness among these national security professionals at some of what they have been asked to do, and at the seeming unconcern among civilian leaders at the Pentagon and the CIA for the consequences of administration decisions. […] The quiet revolt of the generals at the Pentagon is a big reason U.S. policy in Iraq has been changing, far more than Bush’s stay-the-course speeches might suggest. […] A similar revolt is evident at the CIA. Professional intelligence officers are furious at the politicized leadership brought to the agency […] The CIA, like the military, wants clear and sustainable rules of engagement. Agency employees don’t want their careers ruined by future congressional or legal investigations of actions they thought were authorized.

Thus, to the point of the Balkin blog, imagine yourself in the TTB scenario wondering if your superior is an incompetant political appointee giving you orders with the intent to dispose of your career to further their own, especially when the chips are down. You’re being told to torture because it’s just “the way we do things around here; you’re either with us or against us”. Would you torture? Would you believe them when they say it’s up to you to save the millions?

In point of fact, without conclusive hard evidence that millions are at risk, it seems uninmaginable that a professional would kill or even torture a detainee.

We should not forget, however, how Bush justified the pre-emptive strike on Iraq:

QUESTION: As you know, not everyone shares your optimistic vision of how [the invasion of Iraq] might play out. Do you ever worry, maybe in the wee, small hours, that you might be wrong and they might be right in thinking that this could lead to more terrorism, more anti-American sentiment, more instability in the Middle East?

BUSH: I think, first of all, it’s hard to envision more terror on America than September the 11th, 2001. We did nothing to provoke that terrorist attack. It came upon us because there is an enemy which hates America. They hate what we stand for. We love freedom, and we’re not changing.

And therefore, so long as there’s a terrorist network like al Qaeda and others willing to fund them, finance them, equip them, we’re at war.

And so I — you know, obviously I’ve thought long and hard about the use of troops. I think about it all of the time. It is my responsibility to commit the troops.

[…]

This is society, Ron, who — which has been decimated by his murderous ways, his torture. He doesn’t allow dissent. He doesn’t believe in the values we believe in.

I believe this society — the Iraqi society can develop in a much better way. I think of the risks, calculated the costs of inaction versus the cost of action. And I’m firmly convinced, if we have to, we will act in the name of peace and in the name of freedom.

The cost of inaction — the ticking time bomb risks — were raised by the President and repeated ad nauseum. “They have WMD. We must take action now. They are lying. We are in danger…but there is a simple solution. If we hurt them enough, we will find and eliminate the risks…”:

QUESTION: Thank you, sir.

Mr. President, millions of Americans can recall a time when leaders from both parties set this country on a mission of regime change in Vietnam. Fifty-thousand Americans died. The regime is still there in Hanoi and it hasn’t harmed or threatened a single American in 30 years since the war ended.

What can you say tonight, sir, to the sons and the daughters of the Americans who served in Vietnam to assure them that you will not lead this country down a similar path in Iraq?

BUSH: It’s a great question.

Our mission is clear in Iraq. Should we have to go in, our mission is very clear: disarmament.

In order to disarm, it will mean regime change. I’m confident that we’ll be able to achieve that objective in a way that minimizes the loss of life.

No doubt there’s risks with any military operation. I know that. But it’s very clear what we intend to do. And our mission won’t change. The mission is precisely what I just stated. We’ve got a plan that will achieve that mission should we need to send forces in.

Sage question. The fact appears to be that if Iraq had continued under international pressure for inspectors and further review, Americans would have been as safe if not more safe from harm than they are today.

Missing

Almond security

Several years ago when I was working for a supply chain security company, I remember discussing physical controls versus logical controls with some industry experts. Whereas encryption can provide a fairly inexpensive, although non-trivial, way to prevent tampering of software, it can be very expensive although trivial to prevent tampering of goods. Some of my colleagues, who worked on logistics for the US military operations in Iraq and Somalia, pointed out that it is common for crates filled with many hundreds of thousands of dollars of goods to sit in a dark yard protected by a chainlink fence and a sleepy unarmed (or lightly-armed) guard, if anything at all. At the end of the day everyone tended to agree that the risk we needed to address was less about thing in actual transit and more about storage and holding areas:

Recent news has put the almond industry into the spotlight:

Crime officials estimate the total losses from the almond thieves at $1.5million in the past 18 months to two years throughout the Valley. No arrests have been made.

The nut thieves hit Fresno County the night of Oct. 1, stealing a semi-truck carrying a container of almonds from the Devine Intermodal yard, according to the Almond Board of California.

The truck was attached to a 40-foot container filled with 44,000 pounds of blanched, sliced and diced almonds packed by Campos Brothers in Caruthers.

Talk about nuts. Just for perspective, almonds are California’s top agricultural export. According to the article another theft this summer was 88,000 pounds of almonds worth $260,000. This is not the work of the average street-corner roaster looking for a few extras, obviously, as shifting close to 100,000 pounds means the existing supply chains may be willing and able to accept stolen goods.

Fall is a good time to sell stolen almonds, [spokesman for the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department] Singh said — demand and prices are high and supply is still low before the crop is fully harvested and processed.

Most of the buyers are believed to be overseas in countries such as India, China, Russia and Portugal, Singh said. Paperwork that generally accompanies domestic almond shipments makes the nuts too easy to trace. Investigators believe the buyers either know, or choose to ignore, evidence the nuts are stolen.

In some cases people might be paying twice for the almonds if they end up covering the cost of losses with higher almond prices while actually purchasing stolen goods.

On the other hand, just for a chilling tangent, the almonds could also be going to a different purpose outside the normal distribution network. In other words, instead of beneficial oil (yes, biodiesel), syrup, and culinary uses the almonds could also be diverted to nefarious purposes like cyanide or controversial medicines:

A compound called amygdalin differentiates the bitter almond from the sweet almond. In the presence of water (hydrolysis), amygdalin yields glucose and the chemicals benzaldehyde and hydrocyanic acid (HCN). HCN, the salts of which are known as cyanide, is poisonous. To be used in food or as a flavoring agent, the HCN must be removed from the bitter almond oil. Once it is removed, the oil is called volatile almond oil and is considered to be almost pure benzaldehyde. Volatile almond oil can still be toxic in large amounts.

“Laetrile,” an alternative cancer drug marketed in Mexico and other countries outside of the U.S., is derived from amygdalin. Multiple cases of cyanide poisoning, including deaths, have been associated with laetrile therapy.

A growth in an underground market for poisons and medicines would clearly alter the risk calculation for almond supply chain security. While some basic upgrades to perimeter security for stored almond containers will surely help in most cases, there may be another darker side to the story from these stolen almonds. And if the market for stolen almonds has matured enough, better controls around stored containers may just shift the thefts to hijacking them en-route.

Top secret documents destroyed by monkeys

In the lighter side of current events, the BBC warns that monkeys in India are a threat to their national security:

India’s Supreme Court has ordered 300 monkeys captured from the streets of Delhi to be transferred to forests in the central state of Madhya Pradesh.

Thousands of monkeys roam the capital, mostly around government offices, and are considered a public nuisance.

They have terrorised bureaucrats and in one instance even ripped up top secret defence documents.

Of all the things I would expect a supreme court to decide, protection of security documents from monkeys was not at the top of my list.

But already there are some who are opposing the move, saying the monkeys may find it difficult to adjust to life in the wild after having been raised in an urban environment.

Apparently there are no good sources of defense documents in the wild. And probably very few bureaucrats. How can anyone expect a monkey to survive without access to top secret information?

More news that Halliburton contaminated US soldiers

I wrote about this security incident briefly last month. A new video on YouTube now sheds some absolutely shocking and downright gut-wrenching first-person evidence related to Halliburton’s apparent failure to treat water for soldiers or notify them that the water put into tanks was no different than that in the Eurphrates river itself.

It is one thing to read a story like Confessions of an Economic Hitman about the way Halliburton exploited and destroyed foreign markets:

As Chief Economist and Director of Economics and Regional Planning at MAIN, his primary job was to convince Less Developed Countries (LDCs) around the world to accept multibillion dollar loans for infrastructure projects and to see to it that most of this money ended up at MAIN, Bechtel, Halliburton, Brown and Root, and other U.S. engineering/construction companies. The loans left the recipient countries wallowing in debt and highly vulnerable to outside political and commercial interests.

But these latest reports are starting to show that Halliburton was even cheating with regard to the health of US soldiers who had no choice but to trust their systems. What kind of company would do such a thing? From the MSNBC quote of the original Granger [Theatre Water Quality Manager in the war zone for Halliburton’s KBR subsidiary] report:

“Theatre wide there is no formalized training for anyone at any level in concerns to water operations.â€? […] Confusion between KBR and military officials over their respective roles. For instance, each assumed the other would chlorinate the water at Ar Ramadi for any uses that would require the treatment. […] Inadequate or nonexistent records that could have caught problems in advance. Little or no documentation was kept on water inventories, safety stand-downs, audits of water quality, deliveries, inspections and logs showing alterations or modifications to water systems.

It seems to me the company was put in charge of purifying the water. So the fact that no one was actually running the purification system, coupled with the fact that no one was actually testing to see if the purification system was running…

Robinson Jeffers (1887–1962) “Shine, Republic”:

The quality of these trees, green height; of the sky, shining, of water, a clear flow; of the rock, hardness.

And reticence: each is noble in its quality. The love of freedom has been the quality of Western man.